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The Department of Labor (“DOL”), through its administration of 
ERISA,1 has a critical role to play in the regulation of private “employee 
pension benefit plans.”2 Most importantly, the DOL is tasked with en-
																																																								
 † Bernard S. Sharfman is a Senior Corporate Governance Fellow at the 
RealClearFoundation. The opinions expressed here are the author’s alone and do not represent 
the official position of RealClearFoundation or any other organization with which he is currently 
affiliated. 
 1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. 
(Lexis, 2020). 
 2. See id. § 1002(2) (“[T]he terms ‘employee pension benefit plan’ and ‘pension 
plan’ mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter established or main-
tained by an employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its ex-
press terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program—(i) provides 
retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods 
extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond.”). 
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forcing the fiduciary duties of ERISA plan managers (trustees who retain 
investment and voting authority or “investment managers”3 who receive 
such authority through delegation by the trustees). Under ERISA, plan 
managers owe the strictest duties of loyalty and care to their participants4 
and beneficiaries.5 They are to be constantly guided by the fiduciary prin-
ciples of acting solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries 
and for the exclusive purpose of providing financial benefits to them.6  
It is important to recognize and accept that when we talk about En-
vironmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) investing under ERISA, it 
is the fiduciary duties of plan managers to which our discussion is di-
rected. It is not the desires of those who advocate for an increased use of 
ESG investing. Given this understanding of fiduciary duty under ERISA, 
I strongly support the approach taken by the DOL in its recently pro-
posed rule, Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments.7 I agree with 
the DOL when it states that “ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to select 
investments and investment courses of action based solely on financial 
considerations relevant to the risk-adjusted economic value8 of a particu-
lar investment or investment course of action,”;9 “plan assets may not be 
enlisted in pursuit of other social or environmental objectives,”;10 and 
“ERISA plan fiduciaries may not invest in ESG vehicles when they un-
derstand an underlying investment strategy of the vehicle is to subordi-
nate return or increase risk for the purpose of non-pecuniary objec-
tives.”11 I also find the proposed rule to be consistent with federal cases 
that have subsequently interpreted ERISA.  
This Article is divided into four Parts. Each Part provides different 
observations and recommendations that I believe will enhance the pro-
																																																								
 3. See id. § 1002(38).  
 4. See id. § 1002(7) (“The term ‘participant’ means any employee or former em-
ployee of an employer, or any member or former member of an employee organization, who is 
or may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan which 
covers employees of such employer or members of such organization, or whose beneficiaries 
may be eligible to receive any such benefit.”). 
 5. See id. § 1002(8) (“The term ‘beneficiary’ means a person designated by a par-
ticipant, or by the terms of an employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit 
thereunder.”). 
 6. See infra, Part III.   
 7. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 39,113 (June 30, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-06-30/pdf/2020-
13705.pdf.  The DOL takes a consistent approach to fiduciary duties in another recently pro-
posed rule: U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Fiduciary Duties Regarding Proxy Voting and Shareholder 
Rights, 85 Fed. Reg. 55,219 (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-09-
04/pdf/2020-19472.pdf.   
 8. I suggest replacing “risk-adjusted economic value” with “risk-adjusted financial 
return.” The latter is more precise. The former, a term that appears to be rarely used in finance, 
suggests the possibility that under ERISA, non-financial or third-party benefits may be recog-
nized as part of the value generated by a particular investment.  
 9. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 39,113. 
 10. Id. at 39,116.  
 11. Id.  
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posed rule. Part I focuses on the specific legal issue that is addressed in 
the proposed rule. I believe that an understanding of this legal issue 
would be enhanced if the proposed rule adopted Schanzenbach and 
Sitkoff’s approach of dividing ESG investing into two categories, (i) “col-
lateral benefits ESG” and (ii) “risk-return ESG.”12 Collateral benefits 
ESG refers to investing decisions based on non-financial objectives (in-
cluding moral or ethical reasons), or those that benefit third parties (non-
beneficiaries or non-participants in a pension fund or stakeholders in a 
public company). Risk-return ESG refers to investing decisions that uti-
lize ESG factors only as a means to enhance the manager’s evaluation of 
the expected risk-adjusted returns of an investment without regard to col-
lateral benefits. Because collateral benefits ESG comes into direct con-
flict with the fiduciary duties of a plan manager, it creates an issue that 
requires DOL scrutiny. Risk-return ESG, on the other hand, focuses only 
on using ESG factors as a means of optimizing the financial analysis of an 
investment and does not conflict with the fiduciary duties of ERISA plan 
managers. Therefore, I agree with the DOL that risk-return ESG does 
not create a fiduciary issue that needs to be addressed.  
Part II focuses on identifying collateral benefits ESG. While collat-
eral benefits ESG is defined in Part I of this paper, it is not always easily 
recognizable when presented to plan managers as an investment option. 
If the DOL does not want plan managers to violate their fiduciary duties 
unknowingly, the proposed rule should provide guidance on how to rec-
ognize collateral benefits ESG. For example, if “portfolio screening” 
based on non-financial (non-pecuniary) objectives is used in an invest-
ment approach or in an investment fund—such as a mutual fund or an 
Exchange Traded Fund (“ETF”)—then collateral benefits ESG is most 
likely present.  
For the purposes of identifying collateral benefits ESG, portfolio 
screening is defined as a process by which a plan manager reduces its uni-
verse of eligible investments based on non-financial (non-pecuniary) ob-
jectives.13 If screening criteria based on non-pecuniary factors are used in 
the creation of an index, this should mean that investment funds that use 
																																																								
 12. Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff, Reconciling Fiduciary Duty and 
Social Conscience: The Law and Economics of ESG Investing by a Trustee, 72 STAN. L. REV. 
381, 382 (2020).  
 13. Letter from Bernard S. Sharfman to the Office of Regulations and Interpreta-
tions, Emp. Benefits Sec. Admin., RE: Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments Proposed 
Regulation (RIN 1210-AB95) 6 (July 22, 2020), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/laws-and-regulations/rules-and-regulations/public-
comments/1210-AB95/00147.pdf.  This article shares much of the same textual language with this 
letter.  Given that the reader has been provided this knowledge upfront, I do not believe it is 
necessary to continuously footnote quotes and cites from that comment letter.  This article and 
underlying comment letter have, at their foundation, two recent law review articles. See Schan-
zenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12, and Bernard S. Sharfman, Now Is the Time to Designate 
Proxy Advisors as Fiduciaries under ERISA, 25 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2020). The latter owes 
much to the former in its approach to fiduciary duties under ERISA.  
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such an index are engaging in collateral benefits ESG. For example, by 
screening out newly issued dual-class shares, investment funds that track 
some of the most familiar benchmark indexes, such as the S&P 500 index, 
are to be categorized as employing collateral benefits ESG and are there-
fore no longer eligible to be included in an ERISA plan’s investment 
portfolio. Of course, this also means that an investment fund that uses 
such indexes can no longer serve as a Qualified Default Investment Al-
ternative (QDIA) under the proposed rule. This result is probably a sur-
prise to the DOL, plan managers, participants, and beneficiaries. Another 
indicator of collateral benefits ESG is a disclosure that the investment 
approach or investment fund is expected to yield a lower risk-adjusted re-
turn relative to an appropriate benchmark. 
Part III focuses on the fiduciary duties of plan managers under 
ERISA. Here, I argue that collateral benefits ESG, in whatever form, is 
not compatible with ERISA. The combination of the “sole purpose rule” 
and the “common investor purpose” puts significant limits on how a plan 
manager can operate under ERISA. The only alternative for a plan man-
ager that wants to be in compliance with its fiduciary duties is to have the 
sole focus of pursuing the highest risk-adjusted return possible for its par-
ticipants and beneficiaries. If the pursuit of this maximization does not 
occur, the plan manager must be in breach of its fiduciary duties. 
Part IV discusses the DOL’s current plan of continuing with its “all 
things being equal” test or “tie-breaker” standard. This guidance, which 
essentially creates a safe harbor for collateral benefits ESG to enter the 
investment portfolio of an ERISA plan, should not be allowed to contin-
ue. Even if its occurrence is rare, the tiebreaker is a violation of ERISA 
because it introduces a non-pecuniary objective into a plan manager’s in-
vestment decision-making process. As will be discussed, it should be clear 
that the combination of the “sole purpose rule” and the “common inves-
tor purpose” does not allow for non-pecuniary objectives to be consid-
ered in a plan manager’s investment decision making, even in a tie-
breaker situation. If the DOL decides to continue with the “tie-breaker” 
standard, it must do more than just acknowledge that the “test could in-
vite fiduciaries to find ties without a proper analysis, in order to justify 
the use of non-pecuniary factors in making an investment decision.”14 
My recommendation is to start with the assumption that plan man-
agers will try “to find ties without a proper analysis, in order to justify the 
use of non-pecuniary factors in making an investment decision.”15 This 
simply reflects the reality that when there is money to be made, oppor-
tunistic behavior will follow. If this assumption is accepted, the DOL 
must determine what procedures and documentation are required to min-
imize this opportunistic behavior. In sum, if the DOL does not take up-
																																																								
 14. Financial Factors in Selecting Plan Investments, 85 Fed. Reg. at 39,117.  
 15. Id.  
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front steps to minimize opportunistic behavior, the DOL should not be 
surprised to be confronted with numerous claims that economically indis-
tinguishable investments exist. 
I. Defining ESG Investing and the Issue at Hand 
The proposed rule tackles the issue of whether some or all ESG in-
vesting violates the fiduciary duties of plan managers. To begin, it is im-
portant to define what is meant by ESG investing, both in general terms 
and in the context of ERISA. Unfortunately, that is not easily done. At 
its roots, ESG investing refers to the practice of avoiding investment in 
firms that make antisocial products16—such as investment portfolio secu-
rities that are involved in the production and distribution of tobacco, 
guns, and alcohol. This can be referred to as “ethical-factor investing.”17 
Albert Feuer defines this term as “using ethics as a factor to determine 
whether to acquire, dispose of, or how to exercise ownership rights in an 
equity or debt interest in a business enterprise.”18 
The SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce has observed that ESG in-
vesting has evolved to target a multitude of non-pecuniary objectives: 
 
E, S, and G tend to travel in a pack these days, which makes it hard to es-
tablish reliable metrics for affixing scarlet letters. Governance [G] at least 
offers some concrete markers, such as whether there are different share 
classes with different voting rights, the ease of proxy access, or whether 
the CEO and Chairman of the Board roles are held by two people. Even 
with these examples, however, people do not agree on which way they cut, 
and they may not cut the same way at every company. In comparison to 
governance, the environmental and social categories tend to be much 
more nebulous. The environmental category [E] can include, for example, 
water usage, carbon footprint, emissions, what industry the company is in, 
and the quantity of packing materials the company uses. The social cate-
gory [S] can include how well a company treats its workers, what a compa-
ny’s diversity policy looks like, its customer privacy practices, whether 
there is community opposition to any of its operations, and whether the 
company sells guns or tobacco. Not only is it difficult to define what 
should be included in ESG, but, once you do, it is difficult to figure out 
how to measure success or failure.19 
																																																								
 16. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12, at 392. 
 17. Albert Feuer, Ethics, ESG, and ERISA: Ethical-Factor Investing of Savings 
and Retirement Benefits, 47 TAX MGMT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J. 212, 212 (2019). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Hester M. Peirce, Scarlet Letters: Remarks Before the American Enterprise 
Institute, SEC Speech (June 18, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/speech-peirce-061819. 
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A. ESG and Stakeholders 
The benefitting of stakeholders seems to be the current concern of 
ESG investing. As stated by Peirce, “ESG stands for ‘environmental, so-
cial, governance,’ but the ‘S’ in ESG could just as well stand for ‘stake-
holder.’”20 Elsewhere, I have noted that: 
 
In a public company, stakeholders represent an enormous number of enti-
ties and individuals, including shareholders, directors, managers, employ-
ees, independent contractors, consultants, consumers, creditors, vendors, 
distributors, communities affected by the company’s operations, federal, 
state, and local governments, and society in general, when it is positively 
affected by the social value created by the company or negatively affected 
when the company generates third-party costs such as air or water pollu-
tion. The management of these relationships is complex and is usually 
placed in the hands of those who have the knowledge and expertise to 
manage them: the company’s management team, up and down the line.21 
 
In its broadest sense, stakeholders include all those who transact with the 
company internally and externally and all third parties who do not neces-
sarily transact with the company but are both positively and negatively 
affected by its activities. Consider, for example, the stakeholders covered 
by ESG in the context of the environment. All those who are affected by 
the environmental policies of a company may be characterized as stake-
holders. Of course, this may mean most people in this world, if not every-
one in existence.	
This broader understanding of ESG investing as being consistent 
with a stakeholder model is what Larry Fink, CEO of BlackRock, was 
discussing in his 2018 Letter to CEOs:	
 
We also see many governments failing to prepare for the future, on issues 
ranging from retirement and infrastructure to automation and worker re-
training. As a result, society increasingly is turning to the private sector 
and asking that companies respond to broader societal challenges. Indeed, 
the public expectations of your company have never been greater. Society 
is demanding that companies, both public and private, serve a social pur-
pose. To prosper over time, every company must not only deliver financial 
																																																								
 20. Hester M. Peirce, My Beef with Stakeholders: Remarks at the 17th Annual 
SEC Conference, Center for Corporate Reporting and Governance, SEC Speech 
(Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-092118.  
 21. Bernard S. Sharfman, Why BlackRock’s Stakeholder Approach Won’t 
Work, REALCLEARMARKETS (May 18, 2020), https://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/ 
2020/05/18/why_blackrocks_stakeholder_approach_wont_work_491618.html. For a good expla-
nation of why management needs to be in charge of stakeholder relationships, see Emily Win-
ston, Managerial Fixation and the Limitations of Shareholder Oversight, 71 HASTINGS L.J. 699, 
699 (2020) (“[W]hile corporate attention to non-shareholder stakeholders can improve firm val-
ue, shareholder oversight of these stakeholder relationships will not succeed in having this ef-
fect”). 
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performance, but also show how it makes a positive contribution to socie-
ty. Companies must benefit all of their stakeholders, including sharehold-
ers, employees, customers, and the communities in which they operate.22 
B. The Issue: Collateral Benefits ESG 
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff refer to this type of ESG investing—
“investing for moral or ethical reasons or to benefit a third party [non-
participant or non-beneficiary]” by pension fund trustees, including 
ERISA plans managers—as “collateral benefits ESG.”23 I would expand 
this definition to include all non-financial objectives, not just investing for 
moral or ethical reasons or for the benefit of third parties. For example, 
focusing on the “G” in ESG, some ESG funds may exclude companies 
with dual-class shares, such as Alphabet, Facebook, Zoom, Snap, Nike, 
and Comcast, from their investment portfolios. Having such stocks in 
their portfolios, no matter how financially beneficial, may offend some 
investors who are strong advocates of shareholder democracy and/or em-
powerment.24  
As will be discussed in Part II, collateral benefits ESG, at its worst, 
results in excluding those investments that would be expected to help 
maximize the expected risk-adjusted returns of an ERISA investment 
portfolio. At its best, it would underweight certain investments that may 
help maximize expected risk-adjusted returns. Because collateral benefits 
ESG necessarily means that other interests besides the financial interests 
of beneficiaries and participants are being considered in the investment 
decision-making process, I agree with the DOL that this creates a legal 
issue that must be addressed. 
																																																								
 22. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2018 Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, 
BLACKROCK (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2018-larry-fink-
ceo-letter. 
 23. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12, at 389-90. 
 24. Shareholder democracy and empowerment are two intertwined concepts. 
Shareholder democracy was a term coined in the 1940s that “carried the normative message that 
greater shareholder participation in corporate governance was both possible and desirable.” 
Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the 
Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1069 (2015). It is currently associated with the idea 
of “one share, one vote.” See Usha Rodrigues, The Seductive Comparison of Shareholder and 
Civic Democracy, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389, 1390 (2006). Shareholder empowerment is es-
sentially the leveraging of shareholder democracy by certain institutional investors. How this 
concept is to be understood in practice has been powerfully articulated by former Delaware Su-
preme Court Chief Justice Leo Strine: 
[T]here is only one set of agents who must be constrained—corporate managers—and 
the world will be made a better place when corporations become direct democracies 
subject to immediate influence on many levels from a stockholder majority comprised 
not of those whose money is ultimately at stake, but of the money manager agents who 
wield the end-users’ money to buy and sell stocks for their benefit. 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Duel-
ing Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 451 (2014). 
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C. Nonissue: Risk-Return ESG 
Schanzenbach and Sitkoff also identify a second type of ESG invest-
ing that is intended to improve the expected risk-adjusted returns of an 
investment portfolio. They call this “risk-return ESG.”25 In this type of 
ESG investing, ESG factors are to be incorporated into the investment 
analysis of a plan manager if those factors are purely used to enhance the 
manager’s evaluation of the risk and/or return of the investment without 
regard to collateral benefits or the plan manager’s own preferences—for 
example, the financial markets not properly taking into consideration the 
risk of a nuclear reactor meltdown when pricing the securities of a power 
company that is dependent on nuclear power.26 The purpose of utilizing 
ESG factors in the context of risk-return ESG is “to take into account . . . 
financially material risks and opportunities that arise out of environmen-
tal, social and governance information; it is not about achieving particular 
environmental, social or governance goals.”27 
This type of evaluation takes into consideration the additional costs 
involved in utilizing ESG factors in the financial analysis. These costs in-
clude the additional research required to reasonably conclude that the 
market is not being efficient in properly reflecting ESG factors in the 
price of a company’s stock or debt securities.28 This may result in an 
ERISA plan’s underweight or overweight position in these securities and 
therefore a lack of diversification. This is another cost—taking on addi-
tional risk above market risk (unsystematic risk)—that must be taken in-
to consideration when using ESG factors. Such costs will require higher 
financial returns as compensation.29 
Because risk-return ESG focuses only on using ESG factors as a 
means of optimizing the financial analysis of an investment, I agree with 
the DOL that this type of ESG investing does not create a legal issue that 
needs to be addressed in the proposed rule. Nevertheless, the DOL 
should be on the lookout for collateral benefits ESG being misrepresent-
ed as risk-return ESG. 
																																																								
 25. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12, at 390.  
 26. Id. at 438.  
 27. Randy Bauslaugh & Hendrik Garz, Pension Fund Investment: Managing Envi-
ronmental, Social and Governance (ESG) Factor Integration, MCCARTHY TÉTRAULT (May 1, 
2019), https://www.mccarthy.ca/en/insights/articles/pension-fund-investment-managing-
environmental-social-and-governance-esg-factor-integration. 
 28. See Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12, at 437 (“Any active investment 
program, whether based on ESG factors or otherwise, can improve risk-adjusted returns only if 
those factors are not already reflected by market prices.”). 
 29. Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 12, at 428. 
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II. Identifying Collateral Benefits ESG 
Even though Part I provides a definition of collateral benefits ESG, 
it may not be easily recognizable when presented to a plan manager as an 
investment option. If the DOL does not want a plan manager to violate 
its fiduciary duties unknowingly, the proposed rule should provide guid-
ance on how to recognize collateral benefits ESG. For example, if “port-
folio screening” is used in an investment approach or in an investment 
fund such as a mutual fund or an ETF, the plan manager is likely employ-
ing collateral benefits ESG. Portfolio screening is defined as a process by 
which a plan manager reduces its universe of eligible investments based 
on non-financial (non-pecuniary) objectives.30 Portfolio screening may 
not be the only way to identify collateral benefits ESG, but it is probably 
the primary way as it is the method by which investment advisers create 
ESG index funds. As will be discussed below, portfolio screening leads to 
both (i) the potential exclusion or underweighting of big common stock 
winners necessary to earn portfolio returns over Treasuries and (ii) the 
potential increase in unsystematic risk entering the investment portfolio. 
Another indicator is whether the investment approach or investment 
fund yields lower expected risk-adjusted returns relative to an appropri-
ate benchmark. 
A. Portfolio Screening 
For an example of portfolio screening, consider the selection criteria 
utilized in the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, the index used by 
BlackRock’s iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF, an ESG ETF with ap-
proximately $2 billion in assets as of July 7, 2020.31 
 
The MSCI KLD 400 Social Index is maintained in two stages. First, securi-
ties of companies involved in Nuclear Power, Tobacco, Alcohol, Gam-
bling, Military Weapons, Civilian Firearms, GMOs and Adult Entertain-
ment are excluded. Then additions are made from the list of eligible 
companies based on considerations of ESG performance, sector alignment 
and size representation. The MSCI KLD 400 Social Index is designed to 
maintain similar sector weights as the MSCI USA Index and targets a min-
imum of 200 large and mid-cap constituents. Companies that are not exist-
ing constituents of The MSCI KLD 400 Social Index must have an MSCI 
ESG Rating above “BB” and the MSCI ESG Controversies Score greater 
than 2 to be eligible. At each quarterly Index Review, constituents are de-
leted if they are deleted from the MSCI USA IMI Index, fail the exclusion 
screens, or if their ESG ratings or scores fall below minimum standards. 
Additions are made to restore the number of constituents to 400. All eligi-
																																																								
 30. See Sharfman, supra note 13, at 6. 
 31. BlackRock, iShares MSCI KLD 400 Social ETF (July 7, 2020), 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239667/ishares-msci-kld-400-social-etf. 
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ble securities of each issuer are included in the index, so the index may 
have more than 400 securities. The selection universe for the MSCI KLD 
400 Social Index are large, mid and small cap companies in the MSCI USA 
IMI Index.32 
 
Investment funds that use this index will have significantly reduced in-
vestment opportunities in two primary ways. First, there is an up-front 
screen to exclude a large number of investments based on moral and eth-
ical reasons. Second, another round of exclusions is based on an invest-
ment not having a minimum ESG rating or score. However, additions are 
made from the list of eligible companies based on considerations of ESG 
performance, sector alignment, and size representation. All qualified se-
curities are included in the index.  Even so, the result is a relatively small 
portfolio of roughly 400 stocks out of a universe of 2,344 stocks that make 
up the MSCI USA IMI Index.33  
Some have argued that adding companies based on positive ESG at-
tributes (inclusionary screen) needs to be distinguished from excluding 
investments based on moral and ethical grounds (exclusionary screen): 
“[A] key difference between ESG and its predecessor, ‘socially conscious 
investing,’ is that socially conscious managers implicitly admitted that 
their strategies might reduce their returns, while ESG investors do not. 
Socially conscious investors used negative screens to eliminate stocks that 
violated their beliefs. In contrast, ESG investors seek positive attributes, 
which they claim will make their companies better investments.”34 I disa-
gree. The former is simply another type of portfolio screening, but this 
time, the screen is based on the requirement of having certain positive 
ESG attributes. If investments don’t have them, they are excluded from 
or underweighted in the portfolio. 
B. Lower Expected Risk-Adjusted Returns 
The use of portfolio screening will produce lower expected risk-
adjusted returns relative to a well-constructed benchmark index. First, 
screening techniques based on non-financial factors lead to an increased 
probability that the big winners in the stock market will be excluded from 
																																																								
 32. MSCI, MSCI KLD 400 Social Index (USD) (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/904492e6-527e-4d64-9904-c710bf1533c6. This index has, 
as its foundation, the MSCI USA Investable Market Index. 
 33. The MSCI USA Investable Market Index is “designed to measure the perfor-
mance of the large, mid and small cap segments of the US market. With 2,344 constituents, the 
index covers approximately 99% of the free float-adjusted market capitalization in the US.” See 
MSCI, MSCI USA IMI (USD) (June 30, 2020), 
https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/3c4c8412-5d81-4aa9-a9c8-4490f9f5e04a. 
 34. John Rekenthaler, The Department of Labor Attempts to Throttle ESG In-
vesting, MORNINGSTAR (July 2, 2020), https://www.morningstar.com/articles/990580/the-
department-of-labor-attempts-to-throttle-esg-investing (emphasis added). 
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or underweighted in an investment portfolio. Fund disclosures such as the 
following tell us why: 
 
The CREF Social Choice Account returned 13.88 percent for the year 
[2017] compared with the 14.34 percent return of its composite bench-
mark. . . . Because of its ESG criteria, the Account did not invest in a 
number of stocks and bonds. . . . [T]he net effect was that the Account un-
derperformed its benchmark.35  
 
Mitch Goldberg has also observed that one reason why BlackRock’s 
iShares MSCI USA ESG Select Social Index Fund (another large ESG 
ETF) has significantly trailed the S&P 500 Index over a recent ten-year 
period is that the fund did not invest in Amazon.36 In Do Stocks Outper-
form Treasury Bills?, Hendrik Bessembinder explains why it is critical to 
have as many big winners as possible in an investment fund’s portfolio.37 
Bessembinder observes that there is a significant amount of positive 
skewness in the returns of individual public companies (common stock) 
that have made up the stock market from July 1926 to December 2016. 
He found that “in terms of lifetime dollar wealth creation” (defined as 
“accumulated December 2016 value in excess of the outcome that would 
have been obtained if the invested capital had earned one-month Treas-
ury bill returns”),38 “the best-performing 4% of listed companies explain 
the net gain for the entire US stock market since 1926, as other stocks 
collectively matched Treasury bills.”39 His results also showed that the 
sum of the individual contributions to lifetime dollar wealth creation pro-
vided by the top fifty companies represented almost forty percent of total 
lifetime dollar wealth creation.40 Thus, the returns earned by a relatively 
small number of best-performing companies were critical to the stock 
market earning returns above short-term Treasuries.  
The understanding that positive skewness exists in stock market re-
turns means that investors are best served if those select few firms that 
are expected to be the best performers are given the maximum oppor-
tunity to show up in an investment fund’s portfolio. When significant 
weeding occurs, like in the MSCI KLD 400 Social Index, there is a great-
er probability that Amazon, or another big winner, will be omitted from 
																																																								
 35. Bradford Cornell & Aswath Damodaran, Valuing ESG: Doing Good or 
Sounding Good? (Mar. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
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an investment portfolio.  If investment funds want to maximize risk-
adjusted returns, weeding out a significant number of investments based 
on non-pecuniary factors is not the way to accomplish this objective. It is 
simply an additional constraint on the ability to maximize returns. As 
stated by prominent finance professors Bradford Cornell and Aswath 
Damodaran, “a constrained optimum can, at best, match an uncon-
strained one, and most of the time, the constraint will create a cost.”41 
The use of portfolio screening based on non-pecuniary factors may 
also result in the overweighting of certain industries.  This lack of portfo-
lio diversification adds extra unsystematic risk to the ex-ante risk-
adjusted return calculation.  This extra risk cannot be ignored when an 
ESG fund is being evaluated for its expected risk-adjusted return. Over-
weighting in certain sectors can also give the appearance that the perfor-
mance of a portfolio of stocks, such as many ESG funds, are performing 
much better relative to their peers. As Vincent Deluard observed, ESG 
funds are currently overweighted in the healthcare and technology indus-
tries, the two best-performing sectors in the first part of 2020.42 Goldberg 
explains that “there are two likely reasons why a fund could outperform 
its benchmark. Either by overweighting the outperforming sector or by 
lowering the expense ratio. In the case of the recent strong run for some 
ESG funds, it looks like the answer is an overweight to the technology 
sector.”43 The result of this recent overweighting in the healthcare and 
technology industries in ESG funds has led some to claim that ESG is an 
“equity vaccine” in times of declining share prices.44 However, this is not 
correct. As stated by James Mackintosh: 
 
Even where an ESG index did beat the market, it had little to do with en-
vironmental, social or governance issues. Instead, it came down to luck; 
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did they happen to pick the stocks that best rode out coronavirus lock-
downs? It is better to be lucky than right; but having, as some did, less ex-
posure to cruise liners or long-haul airlines because of their carbon foot-
print was luck, not a well-thought-out way to avoid the stocks hurt most by 
Covid-19. There are several reasons why Microsoft tends to score well on 
ESG, but its cloud services being in demand because everyone is working 
from home isn’t among them.45 
 
In a recent study, Elizabeth Demers, Philip Joos, Jurian Hendrikse, and 
Baruch Lev found that ESG did not serve as an equity vaccine during the 
COVID-19 market crash.  They discovered that “ESG is insignificant in 
fully specified returns regressions for the first quarter of 2020 COVID 
crisis period, and it is negatively associated with returns during the mar-
ket’s ‘recovery’ period in the second quarter of 2020.”46 Moreover, ESG 
scores provide very little (1% in first quarter of 2020 and 3% in second 
quarter of 2020) in the way of explanatory power.47 Instead, they found 
that “[i]ndustry affiliation, market-based measures of risk, and account-
ing-based variables that capture the firm’s financial flexibility (liquidity 
and leverage) and their investments in internally-developed intangible 
assets together dominate the explanatory power of the COVID returns 
models.”48 Importantly, the use of an extensive menu of control variables, 
including those just mentioned and others, is what distinguishes their 
work from other research reports: 
 
Contrary to the findings of contemporaneous studies that do not include 
such a full set of controls . . . as well as to the widespread claims by fund 
managers [e.g., claims made by BlackRock, Inc.49], ESG data purveyors, 
and the financial press who seem to arrive at their conclusions on the basis 
of simple pairwise correlations, our results provide robust evidence that 
ESG is not significantly associated with stock market performance during 
the first quarter of 2020 once the full array of other expected determinants 
of returns have been controlled for.50 
 
In sum, portfolio overweighting that results from the use of non-
pecuniary factors is a risk factor, not an enhancement to the expected fi-
nancial performance of a fund no matter how well the fund appears to 
perform in the short term. 
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C. Why Investment Funds Using the S&P 500 Index Are Now Collateral 
Benefits ESG 
If portfolio screening as defined in this piece is used in the creation 
of an index, this means that those investment funds that use such an index 
are engaging in collateral benefits ESG. For example, by screening out 
newly issued dual-class shares, investment funds that track some of the 
most familiar benchmark indexes, such as the S&P 500 Index, are under-
taking collateral benefits ESG and are therefore no longer eligible to be 
included in an ERISA plan’s investment portfolio. Of course, this also 
means that an investment fund that uses such indexes can no longer serve 
as a QDIA under the proposed rule. This result is probably a surprise to 
the DOL, plan managers, participants, and beneficiaries. 
The story of this result begins in 2017, when two leading index pro-
viders—S&P Dow Jones Indices and FTSE Russell—succumbed to pres-
sures from the institutional investors that make up the shareholder em-
powerment movement and implemented changes to their indexes that 
limited the presence of dual-class shares. As I have previously observed, 
“the more public companies that utilize a dual-class share structure, the 
more controlled companies exist and the less power the movement has.”51 
Therefore, a primary ESG objective of the shareholder empowerment 
movement—with a direct bulls-eye on the “G”—is to get rid of all public-
ly traded dual-class shares. Focusing on index exclusion was one way the 
movement thought it could achieve its objective. 
As a result, the FTSE Russell now bars companies from inclusion in 
its benchmark indexes unless more than 5 percent of the voting rights are 
in the hands of public shareholders. The S&P Dow Jones Indices went 
even further, excluding all new dual-class share offerings from the S&P 
Composite 1500 and its components: the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and 
S&P SmallCap 600. This means that dual-class shares issued by dual-class 
share companies such as Snap, Lyft, Pinterest, and Zoom, among many 
other possible big winners, are no longer eligible to be included in these 
indexes. 
These limitations on the inclusion of dual-class shares make no fi-
nancial sense and are harmful to investors. In the past, big stock market 
winners have been overrepresented by dual-class share companies such as 
Alphabet, Berkshire Hathaway, Facebook, Comcast, and Nike. This was 
confirmed in an MSCI research report that found “that unequal voting 
stocks in aggregate outperformed the market over the period from No-
vember 2007 to August 2017, and that excluding them from market in-
dexes would have reduced the indexes’ total returns by approximately 30 
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basis points per year over our sample period.”52 This should not be sur-
prising. When a company is allowed by stock market participants to 
launch its IPO with a dual-class share structure—thereby providing insid-
ers with an extraordinary amount of protection from outsider shareholder 
interference—it is a signal to the market that the company is expected to 
be one of those best performers. This expectation is based on what Go-
shen and Squire refer to as “idiosyncratic vision.”53 This vision has two 
parts: 
 
First, it reflects the parts of the entrepreneur’s business idea that outsiders 
may be unable to observe or verify. This could be because the entrepre-
neur cannot persuade investors that she is the best person to continue 
running the firm or that her business plan will produce superior returns. 
Second, it reflects the above-market pecuniary return expected by the en-
trepreneur, which, if the business succeeds, will be shared on a pro rata ba-
sis between the entrepreneur and investors. Importantly, idiosyncratic vi-
sion need not concern an innovation or new invention: as long as the 
entrepreneur has a plan that she subjectively believes will result in above-
market returns, she has idiosyncratic vision.54 
 
These are companies that should be included in, not excluded from, an 
investment portfolio. 
If the S&P Dow Jones Indices and FTSE Russell continue to main-
tain indexes that screen out certain dual-class shares, one would expect 
that the funds that utilize these indexes will, over time, yield returns that 
move toward Treasuries and away from the stock market as a whole. 
Most important for purposes of this piece, the funds that utilize these in-
dexes must now be considered to be engaging in collateral benefits ESG. 
Therefore, they cannot serve as QDIAs. 
III. An ERISA Plan Manager’s Fiduciary Duties and Collateral Benefits 
ESG 
ERISA Section 3(21)(A) provides that a “person is a fiduciary with 
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority 
or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises 
any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its as-
sets.”55 Fiduciaries include trustees56 who retain management control over 
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plan assets and investment managers57 who are commonly delegated such 
authority by the trustees. These fiduciaries must go about their work un-
der the guidance of very strict fiduciary duties of loyalty and care.58 These 
duties are very similar to what is found under the common law of trusts.59 
As described below, consistent with what is found in the proposed rule, 
collateral benefits ESG is incompatible with these duties. 
A. Duty of Loyalty (Solely in the Interest of Participants and 
Beneficiaries) 
Under ERISA’s duty of loyalty, a plan fiduciary shall discharge his 
duties with respect to a plan “‘solely in the interest of the participants and 
beneficiaries’ and for the ‘exclusive purpose’ of benefitting them.”60 This 
“sole interest rule” is a codification of what is found in the common law 
of trusts.61 It creates a very specific and narrow path for an ERISA plan 
manager when considering an investment strategy or providing mutual 
fund or ETF selections for self-directed individual accounts.  
According to Schanzenbach and Sitkoff, “the trustee [ERISA plan 
manager] has a duty to the beneficiaries [and participants] not to be in-
fluenced by the interest of any third person or by motives other than the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust [ERISA plan].”62 Moreover, 
a “trustee [ERISA plan manager] who is influenced by his own or a third 
party’s interests is disloyal, because the trustee [ERISA plan manager] is 
no longer acting solely in the interest of the beneficiaries.”63 Therefore, 
collateral benefits ESG is in breach of the “sole interest rule” if it is in-
tentionally designed to benefit, in any degree, the interests of stakehold-
ers or any other third parties, including plan managers.  
Regarding the latter, it must be recognized that an investment advis-
er that has been delegated the role of plan manager may be tempted to 
satisfy its own financial interests when it takes on an investment strategy 
or offers a selection of funds to self-directed individual accounts that uti-
lize collateral benefits ESG. For example, mutual funds and ETFs that 
track the MSCI’s KLD 400 Social Index64 will typically charge significant-
ly higher fees than funds and ETFs that track the more standardized and 
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broadly based CRSP U.S. Total Market Index65 or Fidelity U.S. Total In-
vestable Market Index.66 Therefore, the offering of ESG funds may be 
significantly more profitable for the investment adviser than lower-cost 
funds that use standardized indexes. As argued by Michal Barzuza, 
Quinn Curtis, and David Webber, an investment manager’s strategy of 
increasing the offerings of ESG products may be motivated by a desire to 
attract the investment funds held by millennials and, at least while they 
are young, their perceived preference for less financial returns and more 
social activism.67 Millennials will increasingly be the ones holding most of 
the wealth in the U.S., making it essential for investment advisers to start 
catering to their needs and gaining their loyalty now rather than later. 68  
In sum, it is not unreasonable to argue that the use of a collateral 
benefits ESG approach to investing, or an offering of a selection of funds 
to self-directed individual accounts that utilize collateral benefits ESG, if 
allowed, would lead to ERISA plan managers not acting solely in the in-
terests of these parties. In these circumstances, the ERISA plan managers 
would be in breach of their duty of loyalty. 
B. Duty of Loyalty (Pursuit of Financial Benefits) 
What the “sole interest rule” does not forbid is collateral benefits 
ESG for the purpose of achieving non-financial benefits that do not in-
volve third parties—for example, excluding investments that participants 
and beneficiaries may find objectionable on moral or ethical grounds, 
such as excluding those investments involving alcohol, guns, or tobacco. 
However, even if the beneficiaries and participants approve of such an 
investment approach, it would still be forbidden by ERISA. Based on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statutory language, “provid-
ing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries,” a fiduciary’s duty of 
loyalty requires an exclusive focus on the pursuit of financial benefits: 
 
Taken in context, §1104(a)(1)(B)’s reference to “an enterprise of a like 
character and with like aims” means an enterprise with what the immedi-
ately preceding provision calls the “exclusive purpose” to be pursued by 
all ERISA fiduciaries: “providing benefits to participants and their benefi-
ciaries” while “defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.” 
Read in the context of ERISA as a whole, the term “benefits” in the pro-
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vision just quoted must be understood to refer to the sort of financial ben-
efits (such as retirement income) that trustees who manage investments 
typically seek to secure for the trust’s beneficiaries.69 
 
Moreover, “[t]he term does not cover nonpecuniary benefits.”70 There-
fore, ERISA’s fiduciary duties incorporate a mandatory “common inves-
tor purpose,”71 which consists in the pursuit of financial benefits for the 
plan beneficiaries and does not allow for the pursuit of non-financial or 
non-monetary benefits even if participants and beneficiaries approve of 
them. 
C. Duty of Loyalty (Summary) 
Two important implications can be drawn from an ERISA plan 
manager’s fiduciary duty of loyalty. First, the “common investor purpose” 
excludes all possible non-wealth-maximizing objectives, including moral 
or ethical investing. Therefore, collateral benefits ESG, in whatever form, 
is not compatible with ERISA. This means that even if the ERISA plan 
documents state that other objectives could or must be pursued—such as 
cleaning up the environment, raising labor wages, excluding investments 
that involve alcohol, guns, or tobacco, making the workplace safer, 
providing better medical benefits for employees, or solving the numerous 
political problems that exist around the world, no matter how worthy—
this would conflict with ERISA’s fiduciary duty obligations and be void 
as a matter of public policy.72 
Second, the combination of the “sole purpose rule” and the “com-
mon investor purpose” puts significant limits on how a plan manager can 
operate under ERISA. The only viable path to take for a plan manager 
that wants to be in compliance with its fiduciary duties is to have the sole 
focus of pursuing the highest risk-adjusted return possible for its partici-
pants and beneficiaries. If the pursuit of this maximization does not oc-
cur, then the plan manager must be in breach of its fiduciary duties—for 
example, if the plan manager uses portfolio screening. 
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IV. The Proposed “Tie-Breaker” Standard or “All Things Being Equal” 
Test 
The DOL has stated its intention of continuing its “all things being 
equal” test or “tie-breaker” standard. That is, the DOL expects to keep 
in place its historical guidance of allowing a non-pecuniary objective to be 
used as a tiebreaker when comparing two investment funds that have 
“the same target risk return profile or benchmark, the same fee structure, 
the same performance history, same investment strategy, but a different 
underlying asset composition.”73 As the proposed rule goes on to say, 
“[e]ven then, moreover, those two alternatives would remain two differ-
ent investments that may function differently in the overall context of the 
fund portfolio, and which going forward may perform differently based 
on external economic trends and developments.”74 Such expectations of 
identical investment parameters, cash flows, and financial interaction 
with a plan portfolio is the reason that the DOL believes that true ties 
will rarely occur.75 However, because it does not have sufficient evidence 
to say that such ties will never occur, it believes that it must continue with 
this guidance.76 
A. Eliminate the Tie-Breaker Standard 
This guidance, which essentially creates a safe harbor for collateral 
benefits ESG to enter the investment portfolio of an ERISA plan, should 
not be allowed to continue. Even if it were to occur only on rare occa-
sions, the tiebreaker is a violation of ERISA because it brings into a plan 
manager’s investment decision-making process the use of a non-
pecuniary objective. As already discussed, it should be clear that the 
combination of the “sole purpose rule” and the “common investor pur-
pose” does not allow for non-pecuniary objectives to be considered in a 
plan manager’s investment decision, even in a tiebreaker situation.  
It should be noted that the survival of this guidance over the decades 
is truly surprising. As the DOL stated in a 2008 Interpretive Bulletin, 
“ERISA’s plain text does not permit fiduciaries to make investment deci-
sions on the basis of any factor other than the economic interest of the 
plan.”77 Schanzenbach and Sitkoff also note that “the tiebreaker is irrec-
oncilable with the strict ‘sole interest’ or ‘exclusive benefit’ rule.”78 Ed-
ward Zelinsky states that the DOL’s position “replaces ERISA’s strong 
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statutory standard of loyalty (‘solely’ and ‘exclusive’) with a weaker rule 
of nonsubordination.”79 If this weren’t clear enough, Zelinsky explains 
that the DOL’s position “flouts ERISA’s statutory text.”80  In sum, any 
use of non-financial objectives in the investment decision-making process 
is beyond the scope of what ERISA provides and is an unambiguous 
breach of a plan manager’s fiduciary duties. 
B. If the “Tie-Breaker” Standard Is Allowed to Continue 
If the DOL decides to continue with the tiebreaker standard, it must 
do more than just acknowledge that the “test could invite fiduciaries to 
find ties without a proper analysis, in order to justify the use of non-
pecuniary factors in making an investment decision.”81 As stated by Zel-
insky when critiquing Interpretive Bulletin 2015-01, this type of guidance 
“implicitly propounds a naive theory of decisionmaking.”82 It assumes 
that plan managers utilize a two-step process in their investment ap-
proach.83 First, it scours the universe of investment opportunities for 
those investments that can maximize the plan portfolio’s risk-adjusted re-
turns.84 Then, when it runs across two viable investments with “economi-
cally indistinguishable” properties, it will have the option of breaking the 
tie by evaluating the alternatives based on non-pecuniary factors (objec-
tives).85  
My recommendation is to start with the assumption that plan man-
agers will try “to find ties without a proper analysis, in order to justify the 
use of non-pecuniary factors in making an investment decision.”86 This 
simply reflects the reality that when there is money to be made, oppor-
tunistic behavior will follow. As Bradford Cornell and Aswath Damo-
daran have noted, 
 
In many circles ESG is being marketed as not only good for society, but 
good for companies and for investors. In our view, however, the hype re-
garding ESG has vastly outrun the reality of both what it is and what it can 
deliver. The potential to make money on ESG for consultants, bankers 
and investment managers has made them cheerleaders for the concept, 
with claims of the payoffs based on research that is ambiguous and incon-
clusive, if not outright inconsistent with some of the claims.87  
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If my recommendation is accepted, the DOL must determine what pro-
cedures and documentation are required to minimize the potential for 
opportunistic behavior. At the very least, plan managers will need to 
document how they went about implementing the two-step approach as 
described above. Moreover, if the DOL does not take steps to minimize 
such opportunistic behavior, then it may end up having to spend a signifi-
cant amount of its resources reviewing a large number of claims that eco-
nomically indistinguishable investments exist.  
 On a more technical note, the preceding discussion on portfolio 
screening should provide value in the context of the “tie-breaker” stand-
ard. That is, if an investment manager tries to make the case that a par-
ticular ESG fund is economically indistinguishable, it will definitely have 
to jump over the first hurdle of clearly and unambiguously explaining 
how portfolio screening, if it is being applied, results in an expected risk-
adjusted return for the ESG fund that is not inferior to the non-ESG 
fund. Without such an explanation, the ESG fund should not be consid-
ered an economically indistinguishable investment. 
Conclusion 
Despite ERISA being clear in what it requires of its fiduciaries, 
many commentators will disagree with the analysis provided here and 
continue to be vigorously opposed to the rule. I view this as a clash be-
tween the personal desires of some commentators and what ERISA actu-
ally provides. Martin Lipton’s recent commentary on the proposed rule is 
one example of this.88 If these commentators truly want to implement 
their personal desires, they have but one option: to lobby to change the 
statutory law. But until then, as with the DOL’s proposed rule, they must 
respect what the current law clearly and unambiguously provides. In sum, 
I strongly support the DOL’s approach in the proposed rule and hope 
that my observations and recommendations will assist them in the process 
of its finalization. 
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